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Abstract  
The aim of this paper is to examine the way in which the 2007 global financial crisis has emerged into more specific national 
ones. The interventionist policies responses have led to an intensification of the economic unhealthy situations in some countries 
of the European Union. At the same time through well-chosen economic policies other countries, managed to escape from the 
threat of collapse of their national economies. 
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1. Introduction 
After the economic, and also mentally, shock triggered by the financial crisis in 2007 in the global economy, the 
attention shifted gradually to the national economies. At first, specialists focused on the analysis of the domino 
effect of the crisis. It was, moreover, concluded that its overall effects were deeply felt, including in the relatively 
closed markets and in the ones with unsophisticated financial systems. Today, particularly in the EU and especially 
in the Euro zone, the constant threat of collapse of Greece and other countries, moved the polemics from the global 
to the national economies. 
 
 
* Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: diaconpaula@gmail.com 
 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Faculty of Economic Sciences, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
42   Paula Elena Diacon et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  6 ( 2013 )  41 – 47 
The present article aims to highlight how the policies which were aimed to combat the global crisis led eventually 
to the outbreak of systematic national crisis. Interventionist policies, especially in the area of public finances, 
although were designed to combat the recession state, had, in most cases, adverse effects than expected. In countries 
with substantive financial problems, policies have led to even greater adverse economic situations. Other countries 
which have been drawn into this conjecture on the basis of international channels managed quite quickly to improve 
the situation. 
 
2. The 2007 global crisis  an overview 
Both, the experience of previous crises and the economic theory, argue that the main indicator that is expected to 
worsen during such events is the government debt. Moreover, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) observed that when the 
credit bubble bursts, private debt tends to become public debt. This was highlighted in the current crisis by 
supporting the private banking system with public funds. 
The crisis started in the early 2007 in the U.S. economy, when the subprime market collapsed. The use of 
different sophisticated financial instruments, whose risks were not fully understood, made its effects to have huge 
implications. In a relatively short time, the entire global financial system was paralyzed. To combat this situation, 
central banks and governments around the world have made huge efforts to support liquidity, and to maintain the 
solvency of banks and other financial institutions.  
However, those who ultimately supported the international markets were the citizens. This is because big relief 
programs are paid by increases in taxes, depreciation of national currencies and so on, resulting in a spiral that will 
only affect the real purchasing power of individuals (Diacon, Maha and Donici, 2013, pp. 149-150). This reinforces 
the spiral effect that the current crisis started.  
Thus, starting from U.S. national economy, the crisis soon became global, reaching ultimately to be a problem for 
those countries with a fragile national economy. In this sense, its evolution in the European Union is more than 
eloquent. While some member states have felt very little effects of the crisis (such as Poland or Germany), in others 
this almost led to the collapse of the national economies (such as Greece). Even if the effects recorded in the second 
category of countries cannot be fully attributed to the interventionist policies, they revealed many weaknesses of 
these countries. 
 
3. Policy responses 
As of October 2008, governments began to exert massive intervention in financial markets. They consisted 
mainly through capital injections, guaranteeing liabilities and significant acquisitions of assets (in order to support 
liquidity), especially in the banking sector. Also, some financial institutions were nationalized (especially banks). If, 
on the one hand, these measures reduced the impact of the crisis, on the other hand, they increased the burden of 
public debt and the indebtedness of countries, leading in some countries to problems of fiscal sustainability (Laeven 
and Valencia, 2012). 
In addition to these interventions, practiced globally, one of the anti-crisis policies taken in the European Union 
was the so-called "Fiscal Sustainability". It has had as a starting point the deterioration of Member States' tax 
policies since 2008, and the aging of the population, which has become a real challenge to the Union. However, 
specifically, it refers to the ability of governments to assume future liabilities. The commission's last report on the 
subject, argues that in the short term, the most exposed economies to fiscal tension are Cyprus and Spain (European 
Commission, 2012, pp. 8-16). 
It is clear that the crisis of 2007 had spread worldwide. Its effects widened rapidly in a world composed of 
interdependent states and markets. Countries where the crisis has not manifested, and the effects were not large were 
very few. 
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But of great interest to us are the states that seem to be redressed by the economic policies applied. And we 
cannot ask ourselves whether the policies and the economic science were successful or if the economic premises of 
those states have allowed a faster recovery. 
Bagus (2011, p. 157) noted that at the onset of the crisis most of the European governments answered with the 
typical Keynesian solution: budgetary deficit. The Keynesian solution deepened the problem in the Mediterranean 
countries and Ireland, countries which after the entry into the Eurozone have lost competitiveness (relatively to the 
Nordic states) because of their increased consumption which has expanded their public deficits. Moreover the 
politics of some of the countries was chaotic in the first years of the crisis, for example, in 2009 the Government of 
Greece promised additional expenses o 500 million Euro for their farmers, although in that period the rating of 
country was lowered. 
In some states a spiraling crisis was formed, the pre-crisis policy leading to artificially supported sectors (in most 
of the affected countries were brought into discussion the construction industry and public sector) and hence an 
unjustified expansion of the average income. The crisis triggered in most of the European states, two policies whose 
combination seems difficult to understand: the allocation of huge sums to support the banking system, on the one 
hand, and the budgetary constraints, on the other hand. 
The solution would have been leaving unhealthy firms to fail, for the economy to cleanse of unhealthy parts, 
allowing efficient activities, with economic potential, to continue. Unfortunately the policy chosen was the rescue of 
firms - too big to fail - indirectly being created additional pressure by increasing taxation on healthy firms.  
 If we analyze the EU countries during 2007-2012, we can say that they can be divided into three categories: 
 States which apparently were not affected by the crisis (like Poland); 
 States that apparently have quickly exceeded the threat of the economic crisis (like Germany, the Netherlands, 
the United Kingdom, and Romania); 
 States that seem to sink more and more into a dangerous spiral of crisis (like Greece or Spain). 
The natural question that we must ask is why are there these differences between these countries? 
Clearly, part of the European Union, all 27 countries were presented in the same position relative to the global 
market and the success or failure of each of them can be explained only by their internal structure. 
 
4. Effects and implications 
The success of the fight against the crisis of some of the countries affected reinforces our belief that this was 
largely combated, and that it now occurs only in the ineffective members. The success of some countries and the 
failure of other countries are strengthening our belief that is improper to talk about the global crisis, being far more 
appropriate to refer to local national crises. 
It is clear that the idea of global crisis is not sustainable as long as more and more states revert to the growth 
phase. Given that it is unlikely that the crisis effects are felt selective, it is safer to assume that the structure of the 
countries and their policies contribute to the perpetuation of instability. 
At the level of the European Union economy after the crisis reached its peak around 2009, it slowed down and 
resumed its upward course only in some countries. This year was the critical point in which the values of 
macroeconomic indicators have experienced significant degradation. Table 1 presents the evolution of the average 
rate of GDP growth, unemployment and inflation in the European Union. 
It is noted that the average unemployment rate grew strongly, and that it constitutes itself into a problem that 
seems to worsen. This is due, in particular, to the bankruptcies chain that the crisis has started. Although the 
government supported financial actors, mainly the banks, which are among the main culprits of the crisis, other 
sectors have not benefited from such treatment. We should note that since 2008, the unemployment rate in the EU 
average increased by 3 percent. 
The average of the European Union GDP recorded a substantial drop in 2008 (with 2.9%) and then 2009 (with 
4.6%), but from 2010 the situation has been improving (in this year the in 1%). From 
2011, the situation took again a descendent slope: in present  2012  the average GDP of EU has a negative value, 
but the decrease was not as bigger as in 2009. 
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Table 1. GDP growth rate, unemployment and inflation in EU 27 (%) 
Indicator 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Real GDP growth rate (volume) 3.2 0.3 - 4.3 2.1 1.5 - 0.3 
Unemployment rate 7.2 7.1 9.0 9.7 9.7 10.5 
HICP  Inflation rate 2.3 3.7 1 2.1 3.1 2.6 
Source: own processing with data from Eurostat 
 
Overall, the EU economy has recovered and emerged from the collapse that threatened it. Individually, the 
situations of the member states are however different. The change in GDP growth rate from 2007 to 2011 was 
different along the member states. While the average for European Union was 0.56, the highest values were reached 
in: Poland (4.34), Slovakia (3.8), Malta (2), Bulgaria (1.86), Czech Republic (1.74), Cyprus (1.72), Romania (1.62), 
and Sweden (1.6). A so called medium values were recorded in: Germany (1.3), Luxembourg (1.28), Austria (1.22), 
Lithuania (1.06), Belgium (1.06), Netherlands (0.92), Slovenia (0.88), Finland (0.64), France (0.5), United Kingdom 
(0.28), Spain (0.16) and Estonia (0.16). The lowest values were in: Portugal (-0.04), Ireland (-0.32), Denmark (-
0.44), Italy (-0.58), Hungary (-0.58), Latvia (-1.36) and Greece (-2.36). 
We notice from Table 2 that both in the European Union and the Eurozone, government debt has increased 
stronger after the establishment of the crisis relative to previous years. That seems understandable when one 
considers the policies rescue large banks in Europe of 2008-2009, but seems incomprehensible in the context of the 
years 2010-2011. In the last ten years, the government debt as a percentage of GDP in European Union has changed 
with 20.6 in ratio. The change in debt ratio over GDP between 2007 and 2011 is 23.5. This value is higher than the 
mean for the Eurozone (20.9 from 2007 and 18.1 from 2000). 
Table 2. General government gross debt in EU and Eurozone (% of GDP) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
EU 27 61.9 61 60.5 61.9 62.3 62.8 61.6 59 62.2 74.6 80 82.5 
Euro 
zone 
69.2 68.2 68 69.2 69.6 70.3 68.6 66.4 70.2 80 85.4 87.3 
Change in debt ratio 2007  2011: EU 27 = 23.5 
Eurozone  (EU17) = 20.9 
Source: own processing with data from Eurostat 
 
It is difficult to understand how it was possible that the public debt ratio increased in the context in which most 
states, after the establishment of the crisis, promoted a policy of fiscal temperance. Statistical evidence of increasing 
public debt strengthens our conviction that the states have applied what they knew best - statist policies to combat 
the crisis - unfortunately, often without any positive effects. 
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Since the crisis (in 2007), the countries that experienced the smallest variations in the public debt ratio were: 
Sweden: -1.8 (38.4 - 40.2), Bulgaria: -0.9 (16.3 - 17.2), Estonia: 2.4 (6.1 - 3.7) and Malta: 9.6 (70.3 - 60.7). 
Approximate medium values of the change in debt ratio from 2007 to 2011 were recorded in countries like: Poland: 
11.4 (56.4 - 45), Luxembourg: 11.6 (18.3 - 6.7), Austria: 12.2 (72.4 - 60.2), Cyprus: 12.3 (71.1 - 58.8), Czech 
Republic: 12.9 (40.8 - 27.9), Slovakia: 13.7 (43.3 - 29.6), Belgium: 13.8 (97.8 - 84), Finland: 13.8 (49 - 35.2), 
Hungary: 14.4 (81.4 - 67), Germany: 15.3 (80.5 - 65.2), Italy: 17.5 (120.8 - 103.3), Denmark 19.3 (46.4 - 27,1), 
Netherlands: 20.2 (65.5 - 45.3), Lithuania: 21.7 (38.5 - 16.8), France 21.8 (86 - 64.2), Romania: 21.9 (34.7 - 12.8) 
and Slovenia: 23.8 (46.9 - 23.1).The largest increases were recorded in: Spain: 33 (69.3 - 36.3), Latvia: 33.2 (42.2 - 
9), Portugal: 39.6 (108 - 68.4), UK: 41 (85.2 - 44.2), Greece: 63.4 (170.6 - 107.2) and Ireland: 81.3 (106.4 - 25.1). 
Growing public debt and its differentiation between EU member states meant that some countries were more 
affected than others. 
Currently, if we consider the evolution of the public debt ratio in EU countries, according to Eurostat, the highest 
values are recorded in Greece (170.6), Italy (120.8) and Portugal (108). At the other extreme, the lowest values are 
recorded in Estonia (6.1), Bulgaria (16.3) and Luxembourg (18.3). 
From Table 3 it can be seen, however, that Italy and Greece recorded a high rate of this indicator since 2000. In 
2007 they entered the crisis with a public debt value of 103.3, respectively 107.2, which represents a gap with the 
EU average (59) of 44.3 and 48.2. The country that experienced the lowest values over the period analyzed (2000-
2011) was Estonia. At the onset of the crisis the deficit as a percentage of GDP was 3.7 (with 55.3 percent lower 
than the EU average). Although, compared with other members the increase of the value does not seem a major one, 
toward its own evolution it almost doubled (6.1). 
The largest European economic power, Germany seems to have an evolution close to the EU average (80.5 in 
2011 compared with 82.5). The country maintained its stability in this area more than a decade. 
Table 3. The evolution of the general government gross debt from 2000 to 2011 in European Union selected countries (% of GDP) 
        
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Bulgaria 72.5 66 52.4 44.4 37 27.5 21.6 17.2 13.7 14.6 16.2 16.3 
Cyprus 59.6 61.2 65.1 69.7 70.9 69.4 64.7 58.8 48.9 58.5 61.3 71.1 
Estonia 5.1 4.8 5.7 5.6 5 4.6 4.4 3.7 4.5 7.2 6.7 6.1 
Germany 60.2 59.1 60.7 64.4 66.2 68.5 68 65.2 66.8 74.5 82.5 80.5 
Greece 103.4 103.7 101.7 97.4 98.9 101.2 107.5 107.2 112.9 129.7 148.3 170.6 
Ireland 35.1 35.2 32 30.7 29.5 27.3 24.6 25.1 44.5 64.9 92.2 106.4 
Italy 108.5 108.2 105.1 103.9 103.4 105.7 106.3 103.3 106.1 116.4 119.3 120.8 
Source: own processing with data from Eurostat 
 
Regarding the evolution of Greece, while she entered the crisis with one of the largest public debt in the EU, 
further developments did nothing but to accentuate this trend. It has now come to represent twice the EU average. In 
this chapter, during the analyzed period, Italy is another country which had a large public debt. Thus, in 2000 it was 
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above that of Greece (108.5 versus 103.4), the largest in the Union. When the crisis started, Italy was already 
exceeded by Greece, but the differences were not significant. In just four years, however, Greece has experienced a 
significant enhancement of its public debt. Amid the crisis, its economic problems were deepened and the country 
suffered considerable economic damage. 
Besides Greece, others countries which implemented adjustment programmes are Ireland and Portugal (European 
Commission, 2012, p. 2). Regarding the case of Ireland, the country has seen a dramatic rise in its public debt. It can 
be seen that the debt ratio of Ireland was on a descendent trend, but with the crisis of 2007 the direction of the trend 
changed, and has experienced a strong growth. The value of government debt as a percentage of GDP recorded a 
value of 35.1 in 2000, 25.1 in 2007 and one of 106.4 in 2011. 
Cyprus has a relatively high exposure situation in the short, but also in medium and long term. This comes both 
from its financial and fiscal economy. Its public debt rose from 58.8% of GDP in 2007 to 71.1 in 2011. 
Regarding the case of the latter countries joined the EU, the need to meet the accession criteria has minimized the 
impact of the financial crisis, at least at the level of the analyzed macroeconomic indicators. In our analysis we have 
chosen to highlight the evolution of Bulgaria in the past 10 years. It can be seen therefore that the country recorded 
in 2000 a value of 72.5 for the public debt expressed as a percent of GDP. This fact ranked it on 24 in terms of 
public debt between current members (27). In the same year, Romania was better in this area, with a value of 22.5, 
which ranks it among the top five European economies with the lowest values for this indicator. Since both 
countries had to meet the EU accession criteria in 2007, the trigger year of the crisis, fulfilling the strict criteria of 
accession allowed them to be relatively well prepared for the crisis. The economic policies implemented to recovery 
the national economies in the period of pre-accession, made their economic situation to be acceptable. In 2007, 
public debt recorded a value of 17.2 in Bulgaria and 12.8 in Romania, placing them in position 6 and 4. During the 
manifestation of the recession, the situation of the countries has worsened slightly, due to their statute of transition 
economies after the fall of the Iron Curtain. 
However, according to Bagus (2011, p. 80), lower efficiency of production in Southern Europe decreased the 
relative competitiveness relative to northern countries. Moreover, in these countries, consumption increased after 
joining the euro area, driven by artificially lowering interest rates. The lack of a real gain in competitiveness 
generated an artificial overconsumption. 
The evolution of the government debt in the European Union must be seen in the light of two factors that it 
involves: the size of each country's GDP and debt percentage in GDP. In the analysis we must take into account the 
fact that the GDP of several countries was affected by the crisis (a result of falling demand and budget constraints) 
so because of the relatively constant level of debt in some countries it is natural to register a growth rate of GDP 
debt. However, in most of the countries, the decrease of the GDP value, combined with the increase of the public 
debt has accentuated the effects of the crisis. In some particular situations, it led to an intensification of the 
economic unhealthy situations. 
 
5. Conclusions  
Following our argumentation we conclude that not the science of economics has failed but not how it was used. 
This is the main reason why in the European Union we have both countries in which the crisis was not a real 
problem and countries where the effects were disastrous. Wrong policies and incorrectly implemented policies have 
aggravated problems in many EU countries, with results to match. Moreover we believe that the most affected 
countries were those where there were serious structural problems before the crisis. 
We believe that the global crisis is over, but following the wrong policies and the misapplied ones, forms of it 
continue to occur in some countries. It is about the countries in which the global crisis highlighted some of the real 
problems that existed even before its onset. The surprise for EU was even greater, as it was assumed that these 
countries would have relatively stable economies, especially because they fulfilled the convergence criteria and the 
conditions for membership in the EU and euro area. 
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